which has thus been defined is the maximal yield of the OCI problem, and that with the help of its optimal strategies, the solution of the OCI problem can be obtained.
In place of a direct solution of the polyhedral game, a fictitious play of the game is undertaken. In the course of this, each sector separately evaluates the suitably chosen initial allocations of the centre (by means of dual linear programming), and reports back to the centre. The centre, applying a certain procedure, correspondingly modifies its initial allocations and sends down new directives to the sectors, which again evaluate these, report back to the centre, and so on. The iteration thus obtained permits the OCI problem to be solved with any required degree of accuracy, in the sense that a sufficient number of iterations will lead to a feasible OCI program whose yield will differ from the maximum OCI yield by as small an amount as it is wished to stipulate. Since planning according to this method takes place alternately at two levels-the centre and the sectors-organically interlinked with one another, continuously supplementing and correcting each other, the authors have called their procedure two-level planning.
Actually, the inspiration for the development of the allocation technique of the OCI problem and the iterative method of solution was derived from the present planning practice in a Socialist economy. The method to be described is in some degree an imitation of the usual course of planning. The National Planning Bureau, acting on the basis of the requirements of economic policies and of general information about the various sectors, works out a preliminary draft plan which contains general targets (quota figures) for the sectors. The centre makes a provisional distribution of the available resources, material, manpower, etc. among the sectors, and at the same time also allocates their output targets. The sectors then proceed, through their own detailed calculations made on the basis of their concrete conditions, to give "substance" to the quotas and to lend concrete meaning to the central targets. In so doing, they also make recommendations for changes to the Planning Bureau. This is what is in economic usage called "counter-planning." On the basis of the counter-plans the National Planning Bureau modifies its original targets and again sends them down to the sectors. The method proposed here is an attempt to aid this process of planning and counter-planning by means of objective criteria.
The procedure recommended also simulates the usual practice of planning in another respect. It repeatedly happens that the centre gives the sectors certain directives and asks them to report on the degree of economic efficiency with which the task can be carried out. The sectors express the efficiency of their activities through various "indices of economic efficiency," whose structure is prescribed by the centre. The method to be treated incorporates this reporting-back process in a unified system, where the sectors at each step report back one type of economic efficiency index-the shadow prices derived from programming-to the centre for the evaluation of the directives obtained from there.
Mention has been made of the fact that, in some sectors of industry, mathematical programming methods are also being used to elaborate plans on the sector scale. In these programming models certain directives received from the National Planning Bureau-the output targets, manpower limitations, etc.-figure as constants on the right-hand side of the constraints. These programs indeed suggest that it ought to be worth while to compare the results of the sector programs and utilize them to improve the directives and quotas derived from the national plan. The function of the proposed process is to lend an organized form to such comparisons and the macroeconomic plan corrections based upon them, in fact to link up organically the programming work done at the sector levels.
The first part of this paper discusses a general model, within whose scope the symbols and definitions may be more easily presented and the mathematical theorems more easily proved. Section 1.1 details the transformation of the OCI program into a two-level one, while Section 1.2 expounds the latter's transformation into a polyhedral game and its iterative solution. 4 These sections permit an insight into how the method may be used for the solution of general linear programming problems; some questions which arise and an example are dealt with briefly in Section 1.3. In the second part of the paper, the results of the first are applied to the concrete model mentioned in the Introduction, i.e., to the problem of long-term macroeconomic planning. Section 2.1 is a description of the model, Section 2.2 presents the process of iteration, and Section 2.3 discusses some problems of economics arising in connection with the model. It is known then that there also exists an optimal OCI shadow price system8: * &=A . Moreover, the maximum value of the objective function in the primal version and the minimum value of the objective function in the dual version are equal-their common value is the optimum P of the OCI problem:
(1.4) max cx = min y'b=c'x*=y*'b=P (x*EX, y*e-*) xeX y
The solvability of the OCI problem is incidentally equivalent to the assumption that there exists a feasible OCI program and also a feasible OCI shadow price system,9 i.e., In (1.10) xi is the ith sector program, while yi is the ith sector shadow price system. In the ith sector problem under the sector component ui, let ?i(u,) stand for the set of feasible sector programs, X*(ui) for the set of optimal sector programs, @Yi for the set of feasible sector shadow price systems, and 9*(ui) for the set of optimal sector shadow price systems, i.e.: Hence two necessary and sufficient conditions may be deduced for the solvability of the ith sector programmning problem under ui. The first is that (1-14) Xi(Ui)00 9 The second is that yi ui is bounded from below on the set qY .10 This latter statement is best put in another form. Let The two-level problem obtained from the OCI problem by means of the sector decomposition (1.6) and choice of the set of feasible central programs as above is understood to mean a problem as follows.
( THEOREM 2: A polyhedral game derived from a solvable OCI problem is itself solvable and its value equals the OCI optimum. The optimal strategies of the "central player" are the optimal central programs appearing in the corresponding two-level problem. Among the optimal strategies of the "sector-team player" there is always a strategy whose sector components are equal; to be optimal, the necessary and sufflcient condition for a sector strategy whose sector components are equal is that it should be the optimal counter-strategy against some central strategy. 16 In an optimal sector strategy whose sector components are equal, this common sector component forms an optimal OCI shadow price system, and vice versa. PROOF: (1) In the case of a solvable OCI problem the OCI optimum b exists and is finite, while according to (1.34) it is equal to the max-min value of the polyhedral game (1, I'). From this it follows, according to the theorem of Wolfe [25] , that 0 is at the same time also the min-max (upper) value of this game, so that (01, $') is solvable, and its value is P, and both players have optimal strategies. so that an optimal counter-strategy, the sector-components of which are equal, exists only as a counter-strategy against some optimal central strategies, but then always exists, and the common sector component is an optimal OCI shadow price system. As the first part of the proof of (1.35), it can be demonstrated that for y*e91*, u*&1* it is true that y*e 9*(u*), is 1, . , n. For if the opposite were the Step II. By definition u*<1> =u(').
Step III (The regular evaluation of u*K 1>). The determination of 0) = v*(u*< 1>).
Step Step III (The regular evaluation of u*<N>): The determination of v(N)-v*(u*<N>).
Step (1.41) is briefly referred to as the fact that x8* is a b-optimal OCI program. As a supplement, take the case where the polyhedral game (0&1, Y") can be solved uniquely for the sector-team player. It follows that its reduced version, the matrix game with the payoff matrix V' U, also possesses this property, so that according to the previously quoted Brown-Robinson theorem, the series {v*<N>} is convergent, andits limit is the unique optimal sector strategy. On the basis of part 3 of Theorem 2, this is none other than that sector shadow price system team whose every sector component is the (in consequence of the above conditions) unique, optimal OCI shadow price system. Symbolically: limN The results pertaining to the fictitious play of the polyhedral game derived from the OCI problem, whose proofs have been furnished above, may be summarized as follows: THEOREM 3: In the case of a regular polyhedral game derived from a solvable OCI problem, the latter may be solved through regular fictitious play to any required degree of accuracy, in the sense that for an arbitrarily small positive 3 the 5-termination of regularfictitious play leads to a 3-optimal OCIprogram. If, at the same time, the derived regular polyhedral game can be uniquely solved for the sector-team player, the sector components of the mixed sector strategy series obtained in the course of regular fictitious play are equalized, i.e., they converge towards a common limit which is the optimal OCI shadow price system.
Supplementary comments
The OCI problem must be transformed into a regular polyhedral game. This is done by decomposition into Planning is directed by the centre-in actual practice by the National Planning Bureau. There are altogether n sectors. Each sector is responsible for a particular group of products; in the subsequent discussion the term products will be used for product-groups, for the sake of brevity. The activities of the sector comprise not only the domestic production of the product concerned and the investments necessary for production, but also the export and import of the product. A longterm plan is to be worked out for a plan-term, consisting of altogether T periods.
This model is not meant to determine all the targets of the national plan. The point of departure is a national economic plan that has already been elaborated (by "traditional," non-mathematical means, checked with an input-output table).
Certain targets of this plan are adopted as constants in the programming table. In this paper they are called economic policy figures.
The centre issues three kinds of directives to the sectors: (1) The centre tells the ith sector to provide a certain quantity of product to meet domestic requirements in the tth period. This quantity, whose symbol is r1,, is called the supply assignment (i= 1, . .. , n; t= 1, . . . , T). The centre does not prescribe whether the required quantity should be met from domestic production or imports-this will be determined by the sector program. Furthermore, it is the sector program that must determine whether the sector, beyond satisfying domestic requirements, also wishes to export.
(2) The centre assigns to the ith sector a certain quantity of thejth product for the tth period. This is symbolized by Zijt and is called the materials quota (i= 1, . . ., n; j= 1, . . . , n; j# i; t= 1, . . . , T). The materials quota comprises the jth material derived both from home production and imports.
(3) The centre assigns a certain complement of manpower to the ith sector for the tth period. This is symbolized by wit and is called the manpower quota.
The directives are the variables of the central program. The constants in the constraint system of this central program are economic policy figures. These are:
(1) Qj, which stands for the external consumption of the ith product necessary in the tth period. This comprises consumption by individuals and public bodies, including nonproductive investments. On the other hand, it does not include either exports or-apart from certain exceptions-productive investments. (The exceptions will be treated later.) (2) Ri, which is the bound of the ith supply assignment in the tth period. (This bound has no real economic meaning; its introduction is only necessary for the mathematical algorithm, but there is no practical difficulty about determining the quantity which the supply assignment is sure not to exceed.) (3) Wp, which is the manpower quota available for productive work in the economy in the tth year.
Those central programs will be considered feasible for which n (2. j#i; t=1,. .., T).
The variables in the programming model of the ith sector may be classified into several groups according to their economic nature:
(1) Reproductive activities. These consist of the unchanged, continued operation of the output capacities for the ith product which already existed at the beginning of the plan-term. Several kinds of these activities may be incorporated in the model according to their technical features (e.g., backward or advanced factories). Let Xikt denote the level of the kth reproductive activity planned for the ith sector in the tth period:2' (xikt >0, k=repr22, t= 1, . . , T).
(2) Investment activities. This concept includes both the establishment of new capacities and the production in these new facilities. Several types of investment activity may be incorporated in the model, on the basis of technical or economic features (e.g., the technology used, whether the machinery is imported or domesticmade, etc.). Moreover, within a particular type of investment activity (e.g., the establishment and operation of a particular plant in a certain way), several kinds of investment activity may be distinguished according to the period in which the investment is begun. A separate investment variable will correspond to each of 21 Here, and also in the case of the other variables (except for investment activities), the unit of measurement for the level of activity is the quantity of the product stated in the natural units best suited for its measurement per unit period of time, or else in forint per unit period. It must be identical with the unit of measurement used for the ith product in the corresponding central product balance according to (2.1). 22 Neither here nor in the other groups of sector activities will the numbers of the activities be stated. Instead, a suitable abbreviation after the suffix k will indicate the character of the activity concerned, e.g., k = repr, k = inv, etc. 
., T). k repr, exp, k=inv imp
The output coefficient fikt in this condition is as follows for the various sector activities:
(1) For reproductive activities, fikt= l. (2) For investment activities, fikt >0, but for at least one t,fikt = 1. As a result of unit investment activity there will sometime, but at the latest during the last period, come to be established a capacity unit which will permit production of a unit quantity of the kth product during one period. The preceding output on the other hand will depend on when the investment is begun, and on the amount of "turning up" required before it achieves normal operation. It is assumed that a specific time-distribution of output (and as 23 Since, according to the above, an investment activity refers not to particular periods but is a series of investment activities over the full plan-term, the level xik is distinguished from the other variables in that it does not include the subscript t. The level of an investment activity is accordingly measured by the quantity of product which the facility that has been established produces when it is operated at full capacity, in terms of natural units or forint per unit plan period.
we shall see, of expenditures) is characteristic of the kth investment activity. It is also assumed that the capacities created by means of the investment will, after "turning up," always be utilized to the normal extent. If, thereforeJikt is for some value of t equal to 1, then it is also 1 for the periods (t+ 1), (t+2), etc. In this sense then, this group of activities differs from the reproductive ones in that there is no assumption that the latter's existing old capacities must necessarily be utilized fully. ( It will be left to the reader to check that the OCI problem corresponding to this two-level problem is solvable, and that the polyhedral game derived from it is a regular one. (In the latter case the criterion (1.14) and the boundedness of the set of feasible central programs may be used.) In the following, the iterative procedure of the 6-termination of the regular fictitious play, i.e., of the construction of a b-optimal macroeconomic program will be outlined (where 3 is an arbitrary small positive number). When these-together with the sector optimum q,(N)_are sent up to the centre, the Nth iterative phase is completed.
On the economic interpretation of the model
The concrete model will now be discussed from the economic point of view. An attempt will be made to interpret some features and properties of the model in terms of economics, and some problems in ascertaining the parameters figuring in the model will be raised.
(1) What does the objective function of the dual problem of the sector models express in terms of economics? Let us presume for a moment that the centre really lets the sector have its resources at a "price" corresponding to the shadow price which the sector reports back, and that at the same time it demands of the sector that it should not operate at a loss. If the sector reported back too high, "rosy" shadow prices (e.g., if it stated that a rise in the manpower quota would secure greater surplus returns than it is actually capable of, according to the optimal program), then the sector would operate at a loss. The minimization of the evaluation of the boundary conditions in terms of shadow prices, as an optimization requirement of the model and the nonprofit conditions in the constraints of the dual model express the fact that care must be taken to avoid over-estimating the modifications in the central directives which appear as limitations in the sector conditions, and to avoid over-estimating the effect of these modifications on the objective function. The minimization of the dual objective function expresses an approach of careful, responsible moderation in determining the indices of economic efficiency presented as part of the report back.
(2) It is a noteworthy fact that in the case of a macroeconomic planning model the game-theoretical model may be realistically interpreted and invested with economic significance. The situation shows analogy with strategic games in that each player is in possession of certain information, but neither can make fully satisfactory decisions without obtaining some information from the other player. The centre has a broad purview, but it has no detailed knowledge of the special problems that are known to the sectors (e.g., the technical and cost figures for the various sectors, the special conditions limiting choice within the sector, etc.). The sectors see many details, but they have no ability to survey the great interrelations that can only be clear to the centre. Just as in strategic games, the situation which evolves depends on both players. Both the centre and the sectors clearly know that the measures employed by the other player exercise a great influence on the situation. Under such circumstances both players seek the relatively most reassuring strategy for themselves. This strategy is the "minimax" solution of the game.
In the present model the acceptance of the minimax strategy means the following: Let us presume that the centre is "omniscient," is in possession of even those special detailed items of information that are usually only known accurately to the sectors. In this case (if ideal computing facilities were available), it would be able to elaborate the optimal program for the national economy (the optimal OCI program). The program thus determined would have a certain objective function value and result in optimal economic returns (the OCI optimum).
If the centre (both in this model and in real life) lacks information, it will be unable to determine, without the collaboration of the sectors, the optimal program for the economy and the optimal value will not be achieved. The consequence of decisions taken independently of the sectors would be relative losses, which the centre must strive to cut.
On the other hand, the sectors, without the directing and coordinating activity of the centre, will necessarily furnish a faulty evaluation of the resources and quotas allocated to them and cannot achieve the optimal program for the economy. Let us again presume for a moment (as was done earlier in defining the dual objective function) that the sectors are made to pay a penalty for the surplus allocated to them as the result of over-estimation of resources and quotas. Under such circumstances, biased evaluation, i.e., a biased shadow price system, would result in a grave loss to the sector. The sectors would then obviously strive to make this loss as small as possible.
It may thus be seen that both sides strive to reduce a specific kind of relative loss. The centre's aim is that as little as possible should be lost of the optimal capabilities of the economy, the sector's aim is that the optimal evaluations should be surpassed by as little as possible. The minimax solution is achieved when both players succeed in eliminating this relative loss. The equalizing trend is, of course, only valid for shadow prices related to the same period. (It will be worth studying the ratios of the shadow prices of consecutive periods, for they will make it possible to determine a group of "discount rates.") (4) As has been pointed out, the economic policy figures of the present model are taken from the original plan, worked out by "traditional methods." Moreover, this original plan may also be chosen as the initial program for iteration. The first steps of the iteration should reveal whether or not the plan is realistic. If artificial variables (fictitious unbounded imports) appear in the sector programs, the original plan was not balanced, but the further steps of two-level planning will serve to balance it. If, however, it is not possible in the course of subsequent steps in twolevel planning to eliminate the fictitious variables, then this is a warning that there is a contradiction in the economic policy figures. Two-level planning thus offers an opportunity to carry out a critical check of the original plan, to discover and obviate any contradictions it may contain. As the equalization of the shadow prices of the central directives is approached (e.g., as an approximately accurate knowledge of the OCI shadow prices of the external consumption Qit is obtained), so will further information become available for the critical evaluation of the economic policy figures adopted from the original plan (e.g., to decide whether it would not be opportune to set out from a different pattern of external consumption).
(5) One of the most problematic features of this concrete model is the economic content of the objective function. The optimization of the foreign trade balance as an optimum criterion is in the present description intended as nothing more than an example. In the course of discussions of this problem in Hungary, other ideas have also been advanced, e.g., the minimization of total manpower expenditure, or the maximization of external consumption according to a given pattern. (This is the type of objective function recommended by Kantorowich in his work [9] .) In both cases the economic policy targets relating to the trade balance must be incorporated in the constraint system.
It is not intended in this paper to take a definite stand on this problem; it requires a many-sided theoretical and practical investigation. At any rate, in the case of the first experimental computing projects, it will be advisable to use several kinds of objective functions and to compare the results.
(6) Finally, there is another grave problem which can be no more than mentioned: the expression of society's time preference in the model. This is partly circumvented by prescribing external consumption separately for each period (naturally seeing that it should increase for each consecutive period, and that its pattern should change in the required manner). It is not, however, a matter of indifference as to when the surplus returns obtained as a result of the programming will arise-whether this is to be earlier or later. It may therefore be advantageous not simply to maximize the sum of all the returns for the whole plan period, but rather to maximize some discounted total.
The other difficult question is linked to the finite duration of the plan-term. The structure of the model as described above may involve the danger of having the program prescribe only investments whose returns appear within the planterm. This aspect would only be solved by planning for an infinite duration, but this device, because of other considerations, is not yet practicable. For this reason, as an approximation (or we might say, by way of a compromise), the following solution was chosen.
The requirements (Qi,) of external consumption are made to include the needs of the so-called "carry-over investments," i.e., those that will continue after the end of the plan-term. For lack of any other source, the estimates of these figures are again adopted from the original plan. The authors are well aware of the problematic features of this solution, and the question will therefore continue to be investigated.
CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, the following is a brief summary of the further trends of our research:
(1) Our mathematical and computing research is directed mainly at elucidating how convergence in the course of two-level planning can be accelerated. Numerical experiments are being carried out to this end. It will require special study to determine whether, in the case of the concrete model, economic information that is available elsewhere could not be used to accelerate convergence.
(2) Parallel with the numerical experiments, preparations for the practical application of the concrete model have been begun. The National Planning Bureau wishes to make use of this method too, to obtain sounder foundations for longterm macroeconomic plans. It must, of course, be stressed that these calculations are at present no more than experimental. They are in the stage of scientific research and can only gradually become permanently used instruments of planning.
For a more exact representation of the complicated economic interconnections, the structure of the model applied in practice, is in some respects different from the simple model described in Section 2 of this paper. (E.g., a sector has not one, but several products; there are several primary factors, etc.) ( 3) The general model described in Section 1 of the paper may also be concretely applied to other practical problems. Thus, for instance, the determination of the short-term plan of Hungarian cotton fabric exports (their composition by products and markets) is now under preparation, using a method analogous to the two-level planning one.32 It is also intended to use the method for the elaboration of regional plans-in this case each sector corresponds to a geographic region. The authors hope that once the computing problems have been solved, the method can be widely applied.
